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Abstract
One of the basic characteristic of a modern pluralistic democracy is the existence
of political parties and an organized opposition. Aside the importance of a representative
and functioning government, we cherish the existence and functioning of an institutional
minority within the Congress – the minority party, the opposition. Dwelling into the
constitutional concept of opposition reviles a more complex and perhaps selfcontradicting picture. We all agree that there should be a minority party, an organized
political alternative. This party is supposed therefore to oppose the majority party.
However, must it oppose the majority? Is there a limit to its oppositional activity for
reasons of majority rule? Are there circumstances where the opposition should be loyal
and patriotic and refrain from opposing? All these questions are connected to a basic
tense in modern representative democracy, the one between the majority and the
opposition within the Congress. This paper seeks to address this problem both
theoretically and practically and to analyze the constitutional role of the opposition in a
democracy.
Furthermore, the understanding of the role of the opposition in democracy
becomes even more important as we are witnessing national crises and emergencies.
Especially in these circumstances, opposition behavior is more problematic and deserves
a special analysis. Should the opposition help the majority in times of crises and suspend
its activity or must it maintain its political struggle also in these harsh times? Which of
these behaviors – cooperation or opposition – should be seen constitutionally as loyal or
patriotic behavior? This paper will seek to address this constitutional problem and answer
the question, "how patriotic the opposition be?".
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How Patriotic Can the Opposition Be? The Constitutional Role
of the Minority Party in Times of Peace and During National
Crises
Yigal Mersel *
If, in times of crisis, the opposition party does
not function, free government can not work. The party in power
does not have account for its functions. The public does not
know what is going on. To rely on the right to vote to preserve
liberty, when the party in power has no real opposition, is like
depending on a jury system to preserve justice, when one side is
represented by a battery of clever and popular lawyers, and the
other by a tried and confused old man.1

I. The Problem
One of the basic characteristic of a modern pluralistic democracy is the existence
of political parties and an organized opposition.2 Aside from the importance of a
representative and functioning government, we cherish the existence and functioning of
an institutional minority within the Congress – the minority party, the opposition.
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1
Edna Lonigan, Where Is The Opposition Party? THE HUMAN EVENTS PAMPHLETS No. 10, 6 (1946).
2
Robert A, Dahl, Preface, at VIII, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (Robert A. Dahl,
ed.1968).
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Dwelling into the constitutional concept of opposition reviles a more complex and
perhaps self-contradicting picture. Hence, pluralism is seen as an important value, but
extreme pluralism is perceived as a danger.3 Political consensus is considered to be a
desirable outcome, but over-consensus may result in instability and misrepresentation of
large parts of the society that are not part of the consensus.4 In other words, we all agree
that there should be a minority party, an organized political alternative. This party should
therefore oppose the majority party. However, must it always oppose the majority? Is
there a limit to its oppositional activity for reasons of majority rule? Are there
circumstances under which the opposition should be loyal and patriotic and refrain from
opposing? All these questions are connected to a basic tension in modern representative
democracy, the tension between the majority and the opposition within the Congress.
This paper seeks to address this problem both theoretically and practically and to analyze
the constitutional role of the opposition in a democracy. Understanding the role of the
opposition in a democracy becomes even more important in the context of national crises
and emergencies.

Particularly in these circumstances, opposition behavior is more

problematic and warrants a special analysis. Should the opposition help the majority in
times of crisis and suspend its activity, or ought it maintain its political struggle even in
these harsh times? Which of these behaviors – cooperation or opposition – should be seen
constitutionally as loyal or patriotic behavior? This paper will seek to address this
constitutional problem and answer the question, "how patriotic can the opposition be?".
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Giovanni Sartori, A Typology of Party Systems, in THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM 316 (Peter Mair,
ed. 1990).
4
See Robert A. Dhal, Reflections on Oppositions in Westerns Democracies, 1(2) GOVERNMENT AND
OPPOSITION 7, 13 (1965).
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1. Demonstrating the Problem: The Patriot Act Enactment Proceedings
In order to demonstrate the problematic constitutional status of the opposition in a
democracy, especially in times of crises, we might use the American legislative response
to the September 11 attack. Indeed, one of the immediate outcomes of the September 11
tragedy was the enactment of the Patriot Act.5 This law can be seen as an initial
legislative response to the terror challenge faced by the American nation. It includes a
variety of provisions intended to provide better tools to combat the threat of terrorism.6
Important as it was to improve the ability of the United States to protect itself from
terrorism, at least some of the law’s provisions place a heavy burden upon civil liberties
and basic human rights. The law expands the power of the executive in the long-term.
One might even question the constitutionality of the law itself7 or of the broad discretion
it grants to the executive.8
Obviously, the content of the Patriot Act is important, and each of its provisions is
likely be analyzed by the courts. It is important to note, however, not only the content of
this law but also the way it was enacted. The Bush administration proposed the legislation
just eight days after September 11, 2001, and Congress passed it just six weeks later. The
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Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism ("USA Patriot Act") Act Of 2001, Pub.L.No.107-56, 115 Stat 272 [Hereinafter The Patriot Act].
6
See generally Michael T. McCarthy, Note: Recent Developments – USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J.ON
LEGIS. 435 (2002); See also Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, Responses To The September 11 Attacks:
The Consequences of Enlisting Federal Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism: Assessing the USA Patriot
Act's Changes to Grand Jury Secrecy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 699 (2002).
7
Ronald Dworkin, Rights and Terror (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Jenifer C. Evans,
Hijacking civil liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY.U.CHI.L.J 933 (2002); Shirin Sinnar, Note:
Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55
STAN.L.REV. 1419 (2003).
8
Philip Shenon, Report on U.S. Antiterrorism Law Alleges Violations of Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2003, at A1. For a discussion of the dangers to civil liberties resulting from executive discretion in counterterrorism, see Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441 (2002).
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vote in the House was 357-66, and in the Senate, 98-1. There are two possible ways of
understanding the relatively fast enactment and the overwhelming majority in which the
law passed: The first is that despite the time shortage, Congress was intensively involved
in all the details of the proposal and seriously discussed each one of them, taking into
account their potential significance on the powers of the executive as well as their
infringement upon basic human rights. On this reading, a broad consensus formed
through elaborate discussions and compromises achieved in the committees and on the
floor of each house. Despite the fact that the Congress is dominated by the same political
party as the president, the minority party struggled and opposed any attempt of the
executive to come up with a carte blanche type of legislation. Undeterred by the national
crisis, the minority party – the opposition - used the legislative process to restrict the
executive's ability to go too far.9 Evidence of this oppositional activity can be found in
the fact that the final version of the law includes a "sunset" provision which terminates
the effects of major provision of the law by 2005, making temporary most of the
authority given to the executive.10 Further evidence is the refusal of the Congress to
enact further legislation at this stage ("Patriot II").11
There is, however, a second way of understanding the passage of the Patriot Act:
Congress acted almost as a rubber stamp. The executive issued an urgent demand for a
legislative framework responsive to the national crisis, claiming that any delay might
invite another terror attack. Under these circumstances, no one wanted to be seen as
9

Samuel Issachroff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An
Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime (forthcoming at 5 THE. INQ. IN L. (2004))(on file
with the author) at 43-44, available, at: http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/lawsecurity/samfinal.pdf
10
The Patriot Act, § 224(a).
11
See Audrey Hudson, Patriot II' bid garners little favor on Hill, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, September 12,
2003, at A1. Patriot II is a law draft initiated by the Bush administration to further empower the executive
with counter terrorism measures ("Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003") – see David Cole, What
Patriot II Proposes to Do?, available at: http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030210cole.pdf.
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hindering the national effort to overcome the tragedy and to prevent further attacks. The
minority in Congress demonstrated loyalty to the national interest and did not place sticks
in the wheels of the legislative machinery. The outcome was legislation passed so
quickly, one might even question the extent to which Senators and Congressional
representatives comprehended its long-term effect.12 Indeed, this scenario can explain not
only the fast enactment but also the sweeping majority in both chambers.
True or false – or partly true and partly false - the second scenario raises a serious
problem faced by many democracies, especially in times of national crisis. While it is
understandable that the legislature supports the executive when the President and the
Congressional majority are from the same political party, it is harder to reconcile the
support of the Congressional minority. This minority – the Opposition – is supposed to
oppose. Its role is to represent and articulate an alternative set of values and policies. This
role becomes perhaps more important in times of national crisis, when there is a fear of
excessive use of power by the executive. History provides many examples of executive
over-reaction in times of national panic.13 This over-reaction is reflected not only in
executive action but also in rush legislation passed without substantive debate.14 It is
plausible to inquire, therefore, into the scope of the minority party’s responsibility to
check and balance the legislature majority and the executive power. Surely, opposing per
se cannot be the one and only role assigned to the opposition. We expect the opposition to
oppose but also to be "loyal" and "responsible". There are moments in which

12

See Dworkin, supra note 7, at 2 ("[Bush Administration] pressured Congress to adapt that Act before
most Senators and Representatives had had a chance to read it").
13
See Dworkin. id, at 1. For a detailed analysis of the reasons for executive over-reaction in times of
national crisis, see Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be
Constitutional, 112 YALE.L.J. 1011, 1022-1042 (2003).
14
See id, at 1032-1033.
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disagreements and political ambitions should be left aside, so that all national powers can
be directed toward a single aim. This is, again, especially true in times of national crises
when national unity and safety are at stake.15 In these times, the executive often enjoys
increased popular support.16 Public opinion and voters - especially the median voter expect the opposition to cooperate with the government. Failing to do so – and opposing
an effort viewed as being in the national interest – might seriously damage the popular
support of the opposition party. Voters might vote out a disloyal opposition. The dilemma
poses questions of constitutional theory and practice: How loyal - or patriotic - can the
opposition be? What degree of opposition activity is acceptable and even required, and
when does the opposition go too far?17 Trying to answer these questions on a theoretical
level rather than the factual one, will be the main focus of this paper.

2. The Historical and International Scope of the Problem
The problems of opposition loyalty are not unique to the post-September 11
American experience. Other national crises, like the Civil War18 and the Second World
War19, created similar issues. Neither are these problems unique to the United States.
Different countries tend to face the same dilemma in times of crises. In Britain, for
15

A different set of problems, which will not be addressed in this paper, is the role of the opposition and
the legality of its activity in matters such as judicial nominations or budget. For instance, we might ask
whether the filibustering of President Bush's nominations by the minority Democratic party constitute
obstruction of the majority rule and an excessive use of the minority power within Congress. See Mike
Allen, GOP Plans 'Marathon' On Judges Debate to Spotlight Blocked Nominees, THE WASHINGTON POST
November 8, 2003, at A01.
16

See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War (unpublished, manuscript on file with the
author), available, at: http://gking.harvard.edu/files/crisis.pdf
17
A different question that will not be analyzed here is the argument that courts also tend to become too
loyal in times of national crisis and war. See id, passim; Gross, supra note 13, at 1034.
18
See MARK E. NEELY, THE UNION DIVIDED, passim (2002).
19
On this loyalty of the Republican Party and its intra-party influences, see RICHARD E. DARILEK, A
LOYAL OPPOSITION IN TIME OF WAR, passim (Greenwood Press, United States, 1976).
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instance, the two main parties formed a joint cabinet throughout the two World Wars.
The same had happened during various crises in other democracies like Austria20,
Germany, Italy, Sweden and Israel21. Moreover, opposition loyalty manifested itself not
only during times of war but also in the context of counter-terrorism. The English
legislative response to terrorism is procedurally quite similar to the enactment of the
Patriot Act – speedy deliberation and broad support by the opposition.22 The problem of
opposition loyalty exists not only in times of national crisis but also in the daily
functioning of various democracies. Indeed, even in times of peace and tranquility one
might question whether the opposition has a right to oppose or a duty to do so. If it has a
right to oppose – what is the nature of this right and how can it be protected? If it has a
duty to oppose – what is the content of this duty and who should enforce it? In sum, there
are good reasons to analyze the role of minority party opposition and loyalty, particularly
in times of national crisis. The enactment procedure of the USA Patriot Act is only an
example, thus, to a more profound constitutional problem.

3. Lack of Theoretical Attention to the Problem
Studying political opposition as a constitutional institution is a modern
phenomenon, dating back to the end of the 1960s. Questions were posed mostly in
political science literature, though it is still regarded as a neglected issue even there.23
Legal analysis of opposition parties is almost nonexistent. Jurists tend to avoid this issue,
20

Otto Kirchheimer, The Waning Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL
PARTIES 310, 319- 320 (Andrew J. Milnor, ed. 1969).
21
Robert A. Dahl, Patterns of Opposition, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, supra
note 2, at 332, 346 ; Klaus von Beyme, Parliamentary Oppositions in Europe, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN
EUROPE 31, 41 (Eva Kolinsky, ed. 1987). In Israel there was a temporary unification of the two major
parties in a joint cabinet, for instance, during the 1967 Mideast War.
22
See Gross, supra note 13, at 1033-1034.
23
See von Beyme, supra note 21, at 31-33.
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classifying it as a political one. Only a very few democracies refer to the opposition in
their laws, mostly indirectly or tangentially.24 Perhaps the most basic reason for this
theoretical lacuna is our tendency to focus on winners rather than losers. We prefer to
study the use of force and governance, not the problems of the second best.25 Another
reason for this theoretical lacuna is a deeply-rooted concept of efficient political markets
which holds that the way a representative votes is not a legal issue. If the opposition or
minority party decides to cooperate with the majority party, there is no legal dilemma. It
is simply a political behavior, motivated by political aspirations. If the public does not
like it, it will show its disapproval in the next elections. In the same vane, according to
this argument, if the opposition behaves in an obstructionist manner, it will pay the price
in the voting boxes. Public opinion and democratic competitions are, according to this
argument, the checks and balances of opposition behavior, and therefore the problem of
opposition loyalty is a political, rather than a constitutional, issue.
However, is the answer that simple? If we tend to justify the mere existence of an
organized minority in our representative assemblies by the most basic constitutional
principles of liberalism, equality and pluralism than why is the malfunctioning of this
mechanism merely a political problem? Furthermore, the whole notion of judicial review
is based on an idea that politics and public opinion do not constitute a sufficient control
mechanism in a democracy. Courts are willing to intervene in political decisions in the
name of human rights and basic values, even when the public supports the legislature's
action. If the legal system is willing to intervene in the decisions and actions of the
majority, why should it not intervene in the decisions of the minority? The role of
24

See, for instance, Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.p-1, S. 19.1 (Can.); Ministerial and other
Salaries Act 1975, Ch. 27, s.2 (Eng.).
25
See Eva Kolinsky, Introduction, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 21, at 1, 1-2.
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political opposition has more legal implications than might be apparent, and those
implications require further analysis.

4. The Proposed Analysis of the Problem
The starting point of this paper is that the minority party – the opposition - plays a
vital role in modern democracy, not only in terms of its theoretical importance but also
because it is a crucial part of the legislature's procedures and decision making.
Furthermore, I will argue that important as the opposition role is, there are indeed some
situations in which it is acceptable that the opposition should be "loyal" and refrain from
opposing or obstructing the majority will. However, there are limits to the possibility of
mute opposition. In cases of an unconstitutional proposal of the majority party, I argue
that the minority party – the opposition - must not remain loyal and even has a duty to
oppose. The occasional need for political loyalty cannot discharge the political opposition
from its constitutional duties. The opposition should be regarded therefore, not just as a
numerical minority but also as a constitutional entity with a specific role - to oppose
unconstitutional activity by the majority. This role, I will argue, is especially significant
in times of national crisis and war. Thus, despite the popular pressure to act quickly and
dramatically in support of majority response to a crisis, the opposition should remain alert
and maintain its role as a guardian of the constitution.26

26

My starting point will be therefore that the war against terrorism and the reaction to situations of national
crises must take place within the law and not as an exception to it. Constitutional law, values and human
rights should be taken into account even in times of war. See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A judge on
Judging: The role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.L.REV 16, 148-160 (2002); Diane P.
Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455 (2003); For a different approach, see
Gross, supra note 13, passim.
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Obviously, this argument raises many questions, primarily regarding the
applicability and enforceability of this role. It also raises questions about the role of the
political opposition within the concept of separation of powers and the role of the courts
in this context. These issues will be discussed below.
Part II of the paper explains the idea of "opposition" in modern democracies,
taking into account structural differences particular to each country. It also focuses on the
existence of an opposition in the American presidential democracy while trying to
challenge the common argument that "there is no opposition in the United States". This
definition of an opposition will be followed, in Part III, by an analysis of the role of the
opposition in democracy. In this context, I will try to parse some of the common features
of opposition behavior examined in political science, such as democratic opposition,
constructive opposition, responsible opposition and loyal opposition. These different
roles of the opposition will help shed light on the notion of opposition loyalty, especially
in times of national crisis or emergency. In Part IV, I will argue that the opposition has a
further distinctive role – constitutional opposition. It will explain the theoretical basis for
the role of the opposition as well as address the need for constitutional opposition to
protect the constitution from the majority party. I will also explain why such a
mechanism is necessary, especially in times of national emergency, and why courts are
not a sufficient mechanism in this regard. It will be argued also, that there are strong
reasons for characterizing the role of the opposition as a legal duty, yet not an enforceable
one. I will conclude, in Part V, by emphasizing the importance of recognizing the legal
status of the minority party in general, and in times of national crisis, in particular. In this
context, I will suggest reformsthat may promote this goal.
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II. Why Opposition?
1. Definition and Justifications
The term "opposition" may relate to many kinds of activities within a
democracy.27 If opposing is about manifesting disagreement with a policy or function of
another, then many activities can be seen as "opposition". Courts "oppose" governmental
policy when they overrule it. Individuals "oppose" when they demonstrate against
government policy. Opposition in the constitutional sense, however – referring to
organized action against the government – is often restricted to parliamentary or
legislative opposition by the minority party or parties. Our focus will be on this kind of
opposition, which may be defined as the opposition of the political group (or groups)
which constitutes the minority, to the actions of the group (or groups) which constitutes
the majority, within the representative legislative branch (the congress, national assembly
or parliament), on the basis of different ideologies.28
Britain was probably the first nation to establish a distinct constitutional concept
of parliamentary opposition. As early as 1826, Sir John Cam Hobhouse noted in the
House of Commons that in addition to the government, one might also find "His
27

There are also oppositions within non-democratic regimes and transitional regimes. In these situations,
the opposition is either illegal or insignificant, and in any case, it will not have a meaningful role within the
national assembly or parliament. I will therefore not focus on these types of oppositions. For a more
detailed description of the role of oppositions in non-democratic states, see Alfred Stepan, Democratic
Opposition and Democratization Theory, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 657 (1997); Alfred Stepan, On
the Tasks of a Democratic Opposition, 2 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 41 (1999).
28
For a broader definition of opposition which includes any activity of one group against another, see
Robert A. Dahl, Preface, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2, at I. This
definition uses the terminology of minority groups or majority groups, since in multi party systems we
willusually find a coalition of some parties which constitutes together the majority and also a group of
political parties which constitute the minority. Another feature of multi party regimes is that the largest
party in the parliament is not necessarily the majority of the House, as some smaller parties might constitute
a coalition without it. These distinctions are mostly irrelevant for two parties systems like the United States
or England. where a coalition is a rare phenomenon and by definition, when there are only two parties, the
winning party will always be the largest party in the Congress and will also constitute the majority party.

14
Majesty's Opposition".29 Thus, the representative entity – be it the parliament, the
congress or a national assembly – consists not only of the majority but also of a
legitimate minority. This minority does not necessarily represent an ethnic or
socioeconomic minority within the society but rather an organized political minority
facing the majority in the legislative assembly.30
Obvious as it might seen, acknowledging the existence of an opposition of this
kind was not natural, even in Britain, which is seen as originating the concept of
opposition. Indeed, in the British tradition, opposing the government was regarded as
treason and could physically endanger those who practiced it.31 Representatives were
allowed to raise issues affecting their local constituencies, but they could not express
disagreement over national policy. The legitimacy of dissent is traceable in part to
religious thinking at that time, which encouraged resolving problems and disagreement
internally, not through public debate.32 In the 18th century, the idea of balanced
constitution arose, according to which power should be restrained and balanced by a few
distinctive organs, in order to maintain liberty. Opposing is seen in certain cases,
therefore, as promoting liberty. However, organized opposition in the parliament or
systematic dissent was still seen as disloyal activity.33 The American approach to

29

Some even date this development to the end of the 18th century – see Nevil Johnson, Opposition in the
British Political System, 32 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 487, 487-489 (1997).
30
See Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, L'opposition Comme Garantie Constitutionnelle [The Opposition as a
Guardian of the Constitution], REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIQUE 1127 (2002).
31
Thomas. A. Hockin, The Roles of the Loyal Opposition in Britan's House of Commons: Three Historical
Paradigms, 25 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 50, 52-54 (1971-1972).
32
Allen Potter, Great Britain: Opposition with a Capital 'O', in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN
DEMOCRACIES, supra note 2, at 3, 5.
33
For a detailed analysis of the attitude towards the opposition in the 18th century, see J.A.W. GUNN,
FACTIONS NO MORE: ATTITUDES TO PARTY IN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION IN EIGHTEEN CENTURY
ENGLAND (1971).
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opposition did not differ significantly during these periods.34 Though transfers of power –
government alterations - occurred as early as 1801, the leading ideology was still the
Madisonian concept articulated in the Federalist Papers, describing factionalism as an
evil. 35 Political parties and organized debate were perceived as a negative phenomenon,
driven by small, disloyal interest groups. The opposition was seen not as a legitimate
party that might one day be in power but rather as a disruptive and potentially seditious
body.36 The legal implication of this approach was manifested in the Sedition Act of 1798
which was used as a partisan weapon.37
It was only when legitimized political parties entered the picture in the 19th
century that the idea of organized opposition achieved its modern and current meaning. If
political parties are the main actors in modern democracy, then the winning party has the
right and responsibility to rule and form the majority in parliament while representing the
interests of its voters. On the same basis, the second-most popular party, the loser of the
elections, has the right to oppose while representing the interests of its own voters. The
minority party becomes an official opposition with a distinctive role of presenting an
alternative to the majority and controlling the majority's activities.38
The emergence of the concept of "opposition" in the parliament is not just a side
effect of partisan democracy but also a necessary consequence of more general
requirements of liberty and pluralism. Obviously, if the essence of democracy is a
34

See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY
THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 1-39 (1969).
35

SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN

The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
See Richard Hofstadter, On The Birth of American Political Parties, in STUDIES IN OPPOSITION 146,
146-149 (Rodney Barker, ed. 1971). See also Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating
Institutions, 61 U.CHI.L.REV. 1479, 1484-1496 (1994).
37
Richard Hofstadter, On The Birth of American Political Parties, in STUDIES IN OPPOSITION 146, 149-150
(Rodney Barker, ed. 1971).
38
See GERHARD SCHMID, POLITISCHE PARTEIEN, VERFASSUNG UND GESETZ [Political Parties, Constitution
and Law], 33-34 (Basel, 1981).
36
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"general will" type of representative government, as Rousseau defined it,39 then there is
no place for organized dissent in the legislature, a dissent which is wrong by definition.40
Hence, political theories which emphasize the role of the parliament as representing the
nation as a whole will view the concept of a legitimate opposition as a negative one.41
Why should there be an opposition in such an ideal type of representation? Furthermore,
even a minimal definition of democracy as an express of the people's sovereignty does
not entail the existence of a minority party or an organized opposition in the legislature.
In theory, the people's sovereignty can be exercised by a single political party which
claims that it represents the interests and will of everyone.42
In a liberal democracy, however, debate and dissent are essential parts of
deliberation. There are a few justifications for the existence and activity of an opposition
within a democracy: First, the assumption is that the best and most just outcome is
achieved through free and open discussion in which different views and interests are
expressed.43 This assumption is driven not only by concerns of efficiency but also of
pluralism. It acknowledges not only the existence of different political views but also that

39

See JEAN-JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 70-74 (Penguin, London, 1968)(1762).
Jérôme Léron, Pluralisme et Partis Politiques en Droit Public Français [Pluralism and Political Parties in
the French Public Law], 36-37 (Thèse de Doctorat en Droit, Lyon, 1999)(unpublished Ph.D thesis, on file
with the author). The same hostility toward opposition exists in general interest Hegelian state theory. See
William E. Paterson & Douglas Webber, The Federal Republic of Germany: The Re-Emergent
Opposition?, in OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE 137, 139 (Eva Kolinsky, ed. 1987).
41
GHITA IONESCU & ISABEL DE MADARIGA, OPPOSITION – PAST AND PRESENT OF A POLITICAL
INSTITUTION, 30-36 (1968). These theories – of national will and national sovereignty – are regarded as one
of the reasons for the negative approach towards oppositions in France. See id, at 58-61.
42
This argument was categorically rejected by modern theories of political parties – arguing mainly that a
party is a part of a whole and there is a party only when there is more than one party in the system. See:
GIOVANNI SARTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS 39-50 (1976). For other perspectives, see JEAN
BLONDEL, COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 156-164 (2nd. ed. Cambridge, 1995); Brantly Womack, Party-State
Democracy: A Theoretical Exploration, 25(1) ISSUES & STUDIES 37 (1989).
43
DANIEL A. FARBER , PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE - A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 59-62,
(1991); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 295-308 (1989).
40
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these views are legitimate and important in their own right.44 Political rationality depends
on a plurality of alternatives and their free discussion.45 Furthermore, we acknowledge
that true representation of the various groups within the society can be achieved only by
pluralism in the representative entity itself.46

In other words, the existence of the

opposition is an essential part of meaningful voting and representation.47
Second, in order to reconcile personal liberty and political equality on the one
hand and majority rule on the other hand, we must assume real participation of the
minority in political deliberation.48 Such participation will not only justify why one must
abide by a law with which he or she does not agree,49 but it also fulfills other goals of
democratic participation such as personal virtue and democratic education.50 The
existence of an intra-parliamentary minority is important therefore to legitimate majority
rule and ensure democratic participation. Majority rule is legitimated by the existence of
a minority that can object and opine on the issues at hand. Furthermore, a deliberative
process based on debating different legitimate views will foster compromise and
consensus, which serve as important elements of democracy by balancing the inherent
problems of majority rule.51
A third important idea which underlines the existence of the opposition within the
legislature is political competition. As modern democracies increasingly focus on the
electoral phase and less on the daily and long-term representation of the individual, it
44
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becomes important to maintain real competition within the political market. The
existence of opposition in the legislature promotes political competition. The opposition
can and should serve as a check on the majority and organize an alternative to the
majority for the coming elections. Because it sits within the decision-making mechanism,
it often enjoys better information than other players in the political arena. Democracy
means majority rule, but that does not exclude the minority's role.52 The fact that there is
a distinct political minority in the legislature might also promote another important idea,
the one of separation of powers. In parliamentary regimes, where there is often complete
identity between the legislative majority and the executive branch, a separation between
the legislature and the executive actually refers to a separation between the opposition
and the majoritarian government. The separation of powers rationale for the existence of
an organized minority – a minority party - is also relevant to a presidential democracy
like the United States . In cases when the same party holds the presidency and dominates
both houses of Congress, the real separation of powers exists between the majority party
and the minority party – not between the branches themselves.
In sum, one can argue that there is no majority without a minority,53 and that the
presence of the opposition in the legislature is not only an important functional feature of
democracy but even a hallmark of its existence.54
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2. Opposition to Whom?
Thus far, we have focused on a relatively narrow definition of opposition,
including the minority party or parties within the legislative branch. This definition
requires further explanation and fine-tuning. The term "opposition" is inherently relative,
since it assumes an altera pars which is opposed. Therefore, one might find different
answers to the question, what is the opposition all about? There are different types of
oppositions. The most basic distinction, for our purposes, lies in the difference between
opposing the executive branch on the one hand and opposing the majority party within
the legislature, on the other hand.
Indeed, the British concept of opposition – "His Majesty’s Opposition" – was
based on opposing the executive branch. Thus, in the Westminster model of democracy –
the parliamentary regime – the majority in the House nominates the leader and Cabinet of
the executive branch. The term “opposition” refers to the members of the House who
oppose the government or executive branch. The British opposition therefore performs a
dual function: It opposes the parliamentary legislative majority, and it opposes the
executive branch. This phenomenon is typical of parliamentary regimes. The executive
branch is nominated and removed by the parliament. It is responsible to the legislature.
The legislative minority party simultaneously opposes both the majority party and the
government or executive branch. The goal of the opposition is therefore to replace the
government and also to gain a majority in parliament. The opposition can also be easily
identified as the party that is not in government, because Britain has a two-party system
in which it is clear that there is a winning party and an opposition party. This feature,
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combined with the relatively strong coherence and discipline of the British parties, leads
to theconclusion that Britain's opposition is an opposition with a capital "O".55
In a presidential democracy like the United States, the opposition is divided
between the different branches of government. In the Congress, the opposition can be
regarded as the minority party in the House and Senate. This is the legislative branch
minority. If Congress is dominated by the president’s party, then the situation resembles a
parliamentary democracy, in which the same party serves as the opposition both to the
executive branch and to the legislative majority. If, however, the government is divided,
such that the president's party controls one or none of the chambers, we may speak of an
opposition only in terms of the minority party within Congress.56 This opposition does
not necessarily oppose the executive branch since it may belong to the same party as the
president.57
In a broader sense, it can be argued that the minimal concept of opposition
requires the existence of a recognized minority party within the legislature. It is a
minimal concept since in a parliamentary democracy, the opposition is usually regarded
not only as the minority party within the legislature but also as the opposition to the
executive branch which constitutes an alternative to the government. This feature –
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opposition to the executive - does not characterize presidential democracies, in which
there is a strong separation of powers and thus a clear distinction between the minority
party within the legislature and opposition to the president by the opposing party. Indeed,
in a presidential democracy, when the government is divided, opposition to the executive
is manifested by the majority party within the legislature. This kind of "opposition" is
part of the separation of powers and checks and balances of a presidential democracy. It
cannot exist in a parliamentary democracy, in which the majority party would lose its
power if it opposed the executive branch on a regular basis. I will therefore focus on the
minimal definition of opposition, i.e. the minority party within the legislative branch.

3. "Opposition" In The American Democracy?!
The above distinction between types of democracies, as well as the refinement of
the definition of opposition, are necessary to refute the common belief, held mostly in
political science circles, that there is no opposition in the United States or in other
presidential regimes except in highly exceptional conditions. Perhaps this perspective is
one of the reasons that American jurisprudence has ignored the legal status of the
minority party in Congress or the opposition.
Indeed, there are significant differences between oppositions in various
democracies.58 Oppositions vary in concentration, which is the extent to which the
opposition exists in one major organization, as opposed to being dispersed among several
organizations; in competitiveness, which is the amount of cooperation or competition
between the political rivals; in the site of activities, which is where the opposition activity
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takes place (elections, legislative activity, NGO activity, etc.); in distinctiveness, which
refers to the extent of difference between the opposition and the government or the
majority; in the goals of oppositions, such as replacing the current government or
changing its socioeconomic philosophy; and in the different strategies employed by
different oppositions.
Based on these parameters, and others, it had been said, descriptively, that in the
Unites States, "To say where the "government" leaves off and "the opposition" begins is
an exercise in metaphysics".59 On this view, opposition exists not within Congress but
rather in the separation of powers; each branch balances another branch, thus "opposing"
it60. This argument about the lack of opposition in the United States was based primarily
on specific features of American democracy: oppositional activity is dispersed among
institutions such as the White House, the House of Representatives, the Senate and the
judiciary. American federalism means that opposition is also dispersed among state and
federal entities.61 This lack of concentration weakens the opposition. Furthermore, in
American society there is broad consensus over core values, such that political cleavages
are usually minor and are resolved through ad-hoc coalitions, deals and negotiations, not
necessarily according to party lines.62
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Extremists.63 There is, of course, political competition around elections, but the
competition is subsequently replaced by a high degree of cooperation.64 Major political
reforms tend to be achieved on a long-term basis, through consensus and broad public
support.65 Among different political parties in government there is generally an
agreement over the goals, and the differences in their ideologies are limited to the means
to achieve these goals. Another factor reducing American opposition is the fact that
political parties are relatively weak and decentralized, oriented toward the center of the
political spectrum and competing for the median voter.66 These parties lack cohesive
power and fail to exercise internal discipline over their delegates. Standing committees in
Congress are very powerful and thus grant the individual representative independence
from his party. Minority parties, in particular, have a weak leadership and negative
incentives to oppose the majority party in a meaningful manner.67 Thus, the argument
goes, despite the fact that the United States, like Britain, has a dual party system, which
can foster a strong and distinctive opposition, American opposition is significantly
weaker than British opposition.68
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It is important to note these features, but we must emphasize their descriptive
character. They may explain why the American opposition is weak and not
institutionalized. They cannot completely negate its existence.69 Indeed, recent studies
show that over the years, American parties have become stronger. At the beginning of the
21st century, hence, there is more Congressional party cohesion, organization and
leadership.70 Even if there are indications that American political parties are inherently
weak, the actual fact of this weakness does not obviate the need for an opposition party
within a democracy. The fact that a certain institution in a certain state is weak does not
lead to the conclusion that it is superfluous and has no role. On the contrary, on a
normative level, the weakness of the opposition may lead to a call for change.
My view is that every democracy has an opposition, but structural and social
differences create different patterns of oppositions. The fact that we find different
patterns of oppositions should not change our normative legal point of view on the role of
oppositions in democracies. Parliamentary and presidential systems both require a
plurality of views within the legislature; control over the majority's power; open public
debate; and a real alternative to the policies

and actions of the majority. The

constitutional status of the opposition is important in any democracy. Even in presidential
democracies, opposition exists. There is always a minority party in the Congress.71 The
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which oppositions employ, as well as in their power and effectiveness. But these
differences do not necessarily mean that the opposition does not have the potential to be
strong, and they certainly do not remove the normative justifications for the presence of
an opposition.72 Furthermore, a strong separation of powers is not equivalent to a strong
opposition party. These are different concepts and different mechanisms. There is a
difference between a situation in which one branch checks and balances another and a
situation in which there is an internal opposition within a specific branch.73 The
legislature's checks and balances on the president in a presidential democracy do not
preclude the checks and balances by the minority party in the legislature. This is
especially true, taking into account the fact that the majority party in the legislature is in
the end of the day an essential part of the government as it is the one which enacts the
laws. The minority party – the opposition – is external to the government.74 Thus, it may
sometimes be in a better position to criticize both the legislative majority as well as the
president. In sum, in a modern democracy there is always an "opposition" and we should
– at least from a legal point of view - focus not on its de facto existence but rather on its
normative role.
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III. Limits and Duties of Oppositions
Analysis of the nature of opposition, the justifications for its existence and its role
in different types of regimes is indeed crucial in order to understand what the opposition
is. This analysis, however, does not by itself enable a better understanding of the exact
role of the opposition and its interaction with the majority. Even if we assume that it is
important to have an organized opposition within the legislature, it is still not clear what
its role is and whether it is limited. The mere idea that the minority party's role is "to
oppose" might seem simplistic at first glance. One might wonder whether there is a duty
to oppose or merely the possibility of doing so, and whether the oppositional behavior is
more of a political phenomenon than a legal concept. Furthermore, though there may be
good justifications and reasons for the existence and function of an opposition in a
democracy, it is clear – even intuitively – that at a certain point, the opposition should be
restrained. Excessive oppositional activity might result in a majority decision to ignore
the minority, which is seeking only disagreement at the expense of consensus. In other
words, there is a delicate equilibrium between consensus and dissent.75 These questions
become even more troubling in times of national crisis. Does the fact that the opposition
has the option of opposing the majority imply an obligation to do so? And should not we
speak also of an obligation of the opposition to be loyal, to put aside political ambitions
and refrain from oppositional activity during national emergencies? Answering these
questions requires further understanding of the idea of opposition in modern democracies
and its justifications.
75
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1. Democratic Opposition
Perhaps the most basic restraint on the minority party in the legislature is its
democratic character and its adherence to democratic values and ideas. Democracy
encourages pluralism and diversity. The ideas of pluralism and diversity are based on the
legitimacy of the different alternatives. Hence, a non-democratic party or opposition is
not a legitimate one.76 If it does not accept the rules of the game – as a matter of
principle77 - it can not play it at all. The opposition should oppose the government and not
the democratic system itself. 78 Its legitimacy is based not on the fact that it rejects the
existence of the state but rather on the fact that it seeks to promote the general good by
proposing an alternative plan to the one offered by the majority.79 Hence, we expect the
opposition to be a democratic opposition.80 There are a number of justifications for
requiring opposition to be democratic. One is that democracy has the right and
responsibility to protect itself from its enemies.81 Another is the liberal idea that one
cannot exploit the freedom granted by a democracy as a platform for destroying that very
freedom. This requirement that opposition be democratic is a substantive, rather than
76
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procedural, requirement of democracy; it looks not merely to the equal representation of
all views but also at their content.82
Comparative legal analysis shows that many democracies which have faced
threats to their existence have absorbed this concept of democratic opposition by enacting
constitutional provisions imposing a duty on political parties to be democratic and
enabling courts to dissolve an undemocratic party.83 These provisions do not relate to the
opposition as such but rather to political parties. However, they obviously have
consequences for the activities of parties as an organized opposition.
It is obviously difficult to define when exactly an opposition becomes nondemocratic. An overly narrow definition of “democratic” could serve the interests of
those in power and exclude important calls for change arising from society. It is not easy
to find a single, comprehensive definition of democracy.84 Furthermore, democracy faces
a strategic dilemma of whether to absorb extremists into the democratic arena, thus
rendering them transparent and getting them used to playing by democratic rules, or to
exclude them, forcing their activities underground, where they are almost de facto
immune from control. Disqualifying an opposition party causes also the loss of its effect
as moderating social pressure.85 On the other hand, an integrated non-democratic
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opposition has its own dangers. It might help extremists use legislative means to
legitimize their ideas. It might also adopt an irresponsible policy, making groundless
promises to the voters in the knowledge that there is no real chance it will have to follow
through.86 This tendency might also force other parties to become more extremists, trying
to avoid a leak of voters to the political extremes.
Because it is so difficult to know where to draw the line, it is rare for a democracy
to exclude the opposition as non-democratic.87 The call for "change" by a party or faction
is not – by itself – non-democratic. Similarly, it is legitimate to oppose the personal
composition of the government and its policies. Opposition parties such as the
Communist party or other extremists are generally not excludedfrom the democratic
competition, despite their problematic agendas, either because of a gap between these
parties' goals and their actual practice or because of a certain degree of tolerance of non-

86

See Sartori, supra note 3, at 333, for a discussion of the tendency of opposition parties to behave
irresponsibly.
87
There are a few examples of democracies who have dissolved political parties, always parties from the
opposition. See for example cases, from Germany and from Turkey, that reached the European Commission
of Human Rights or the European Court of Human Rights. See The Communist Party Case, 1 YEARBOOK
OF EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON H.R. 222 (1955-1957); United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 62
Eur.Ct.H.R. 1 (1998); 26 Eur.H.R.Rep. (1998) 121; The Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 75
Eur.Ct.H.R . 1233 (1998); 27 Eur.H.R.Rep 51; Case of Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey,
8 Eur.Ct.H.R.333 (1999); Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, (Apps. No.
41340/98, 41342/98, 41344/98) Eur.Ct.H.R. (2001) (Third Section) unpublished, at:
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=9&Action=Html&X=112213208&Notice=0&Noticem
ode=&RelatedMode=0; followed by Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, (Apps.
41340/98, 41342/98, 41344/98 Eur.Ct.H.R. (2003)(Grand Chamber), unpublished, at:
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=13&Action=Html&X=112213359&Notice=0&Notice
mode=&RelatedMode=0; The Case of Yazar and Others v. Turkey ,(Apps. No. 22723/93, 22724/93,
22725/93, Eur.Ct.H.R. (2002) unpublished, at:
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=10&Action=Html&X=112213325&Notice=0&Notice
mode=&RelatedMode=0; The Case of Demokrasi Partisi v. Turkey, 25141/94 Eur.Ct.H.R.
( 2002)(unpublished, at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2002/dec/DICLE(DemocraticParty)judepress.htm
It should be noted that not in all the cases the court had actually authorized the ban. The cases where this
practice was not authorized were cases in which the court had found that there were not sufficient evidence
for disqualifying the political party and thus the mean used was not proportional to the danger. See for
instance, Case of Freedom and Democracy Party (Özdep) v. Turkey, 8 Eur.Ct.H.R.333 (1999)

30
democratic groups.88 However, violence, incitement to violence, or a declared goal of
destroying the state are often considered non-democratic and unacceptable oppositional
behavior.89 Terrorist activity or support of terrorism is impermissible and contradicts the
basic values of democracy.90 There is no conclusive definition of a non-democratic
opposition. We acknowledge, however, that this concept does exist and might, in certain
rare situations, lead to actual sanctions against this kind of opposition. Despite the
structural importance of the very existence of an opposition in a democracy, as well as
the added value of pluralism and competing ideas, democracy limits the scope of
opposition to democratic opposition.

2. Constructive Opposition
There is more to legitimate oppositional behavior than just the requirement that an
opposition be democratic. We might think that the main and perhaps only role of the
opposition is to oppose and therefore expect the minority party to vote against any
legislative proposal of the majority and to use all available procedural tools to hinder the
majority's ability to rule. However, ongoing oppositional behavior of this kind would
eventually make it very difficult to govern. Furthermore, if the outcome of such behavior
is obstructing the power of the majority, what is the democratic justification for it? After
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all, the majority’s electoral triumph makes its rule legitimate. It might be even foolish to
dissent from any majority proposal, since the majority has the power to regulate the
minority party's procedural rights and could even deny these rights totally.91 On the other
hand, if the majority has full legitimacy to govern and rule, what is the point of having an
opposition that is not supposed to oppose?
Indeed, there is serious tension between the minority's right - and even duty - to
dissent, and the majority 's right to govern. The resolvment of this tension can be based on
the Roman distinction between potetas (oppose) and imperium (govern). It is difficult to
justify the existence of the minority if its sole function is to oppose ( potetas). There is no
point to an institution that exists in order to say "No" to any initiative of the majority.
Such behavior is ineffective, anyway, because the opposition is a numerical minority. A
consistent opposition can also be regarded as undemocratic if it regularly obstructs the
majority on any matter. We should therefore speak not simply about an opposition but
rather about a constructive opposition. This kind of opposition does not oppose any
matter as such but rather proposes an alternative ideology or plan. Such an opposition is
aimed toward governance (imperium) and not mere dissent. It does more than just
oppose, by combining and even explaining its opposition with its own alternative plan.92
Opposition should be constructive not only to avoid preventing governance by the
majority, but also to serve some of the justifications for the existence of an opposition in
first place. Diversity and pluralism are about having different sets of ideas and ideologies,
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not just an ideology and an objection to the ideology.93 If we need an opposition because
we need an alternative plan and the possibility of replacing the government, then the
opposition must be constructive and offer a real alternative to the majority.
The concept of constructive opposition has some interesting legal implications. In
Germany, for instance, though the opposition has the right to vote a non confidence vote
removing the chancellor, it can do so only if it produces an alternative government - or
even an alternative policy94 - which enjoys sufficient support.95 A similar mechanism
exists in other countries.96 Another example is the concept of bone fide use of procedure.
Indeed, the opposition can use procedural techniques in parliamentary rules and
regulations in order to place a burden on the ability of the majority to rule effectively. It
is hard to distinguish, however, between a mala fide usage of a certain technique in order
to obstruct and a bone fide usage in order to advance a legitimate goal of the opposition.97
One possibility is to check whether the procedure was used not only in order to cause
difficulty for the majority (oppose – potetas) but in order to rule (imperium) and be
constructive.
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3. Responsible Opposition
The notion of constructive alternative as one of the oppositional functions lays a
foundation for a further feature of oppositional and party behavior – responsible
opposition. If we really want to give the voter - or the public as a whole - the possibility
of choosing, political parties should offer distinct ideologies for important matters, while
responding to social changes and cleavages. They should therefore be responsible to the
voters and the political system as a whole. The opposition, under this idea, must have its
own agenda which is clear and includes a reference to the main governmental policies
and activities. It must offer alternative ideas on important matters and highlight the
differences and distinctive marks of its policy.98 This kind of opposition can be seen as
accountable.99 Just as the majority is accountable for its policy and functioning, so is the
opposition. It has a duty toward the public - and not only its voters – to oppose and offer
a real alternative. Only if the parties have a clear policy, can the voter decide whether to
vote them in or out, based on their promises. Therefore, we expect a responsible
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opposition to keep its promises to the voters.100 Indeed, this approach of responsibility
assumes that parties and ideologies are the main actors in an efficient and meaningful
democracy.
Having discussed this concept of responsibility, we can understand why
oppositions sometimes tend to behave irresponsibly. If, for instance, an opposition party
knows that there is no real chance that it will be called into government or gain a
majority, it might adopt an irresponsible policy.101 It is not really accountable and
therefore not responsible. The opposite situation can also arise. Parties might have an
interest in camouflaging their real ideologies in order to attract the maximum number of
voters. They then become "catch all" parties, supermarkets of ideologies that can hardly
be distinctive and cannot be held accountable.102
Perhaps the best example of the concept of opposition responsibility is the British
practice of "Shadow Government". The opposition party has its own leader who has
important intra-party powers.103 He or she is actually presented and referred to as an
alternative prime minister.104 The opposition also forms a "cabinet", which includes
leading parliament members, each of whom functions as an alternative to one of the
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"real" ministers. The opposition party forms its own agenda and presents it to the public
as an alternative policy to the governmental one.105

4. Loyal Opposition?
Loyalty is one of the most problematic notions of opposition. Even if an
opposition is democratic, and even if its functioning is constructive and responsible, it
may adopt another behavior – that of a loyal opposition. Opposition loyalty assumes an
incentive of the opposition to help the majority and to carefullychoose the cir cumstances
in which it opposes it. Obviously, the opposition need not help the majority rule, since the
majority has this power inherently, but it may sometimes have a tendency to facilitate the
enactment procedure and grant a safety-net to the majority party by minimizing or
avoiding a political debate on certain issues. Indeed, the phenomenon of majorityopposition cooperation is not rare by itself, as there are often situations in which political
parties form a cartel which is aimed at advancing their own benefit or reducing the
competitiveness of third parties. These are "party cartels", which are usually focused on
party finance and the formation of entry barriers for competing parties.106
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Opposition loyalty is also a type of party cooperation. However, this cooperation
is not a cartel aimed at reducing the political competition or achieving financial benefits,
but rather a cooperation on the basis of mutual interests due to an exceptional social
reality. These are situations, where the opposition and the majority have strong
incentives, in terms of public opinion and their constituency, to cooperate one with the
other. These are, very often, circumstances of an emergency or a national crisis. In these
situations, the major political parties might cooperate in order to show the public that the
enacted policy enjoys broad consensus.107 The opposition will often justify this behavior
in terms of loyalty to national interests. At the same time, the majority will make a real
effort to cooperate with the minority. What are the incentives for this political cease-fire?
The majority needs the opposition's support in order to establish public
confidence in its policies. This manifestation of consensus is also important as a signal to
other entities – such as enemies during war or world financial markets.108 As a matter of
practice, the government or majority party might use all kinds of techniques to ensure
opposition support and loyalty in times of crises. For instance, in addition to public calls
for "opposition loyalty," the majority may consult with the leader of the opposition or
some members of the minority party and even disclose classified information to them, on
the basis of a "gentleman’s agreement" not to use the information as opposition
propaganda.109
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Opposition loyalty is an interest not just of the ruling party but also of the
opposition itself. As foreign policy and governance become more complicated and
demand dynamics and flexibility, it is obvious that not every matter can be decided
throughout a majority-minority debate. There has to be, thus, a minimum amount of
opposition confidence in the government.110 Furthermore, during times of crises, public
opinion might disfavor dissent, especially if the disagreement is seen as hindering the
efforts of the majority to restore security and calm. Studies have shown an increase in
support for the government in times of national crisis.111 This political premium gained
during a crisis is a factor that might deter the opposition from opposing the majority. This
cooperative situation creates a paradox: political cost-benefit calculations might suggest
that in order for the opposition to gain support – or at least not to lose it – it must
cooperate with the government. Adopting this strategy for too long, however, will make it
difficult for the opposition to persuade the electorate to give it power – why must there be
a change in government, if the alternative is the same?112 The opposition has an interest
in cooperating in these situations in order to gain practical experience and public
legitimacy as a potential future leader. In this state of affairs, the measures necessary for
the opposition to play a future role as a leader paralyze its current role as an opponent.113
Indeed, there are many kinds of circumstances in which we would expect the
opposition to be loyal, but the most obvious ones are national catastrophe or an external
threat.114 War and a massive terror attack are two examples in which the opposition is
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expected to put aside its own political agenda and rivalries in order to help the country
survive and strike back. Only when the clouds of danger have passed can the opposition
resume its normal activity. In a sense, exceptional circumstances of emergency might
base an expectation by which the opposition will temporarily sustain its regular
opposition function. This expectation, as mentioned above, might be based not only on
patriotic intuition but also on practical advantages such as efficient and responsive
legislature proceedings, inducement of social consensus and strengthening of national
unity.
There is also a further reason for this sudden cooperation of the major political
rivals, in times of crises. This reason is connected to the type of interests and right that
are often violated in times of national crises. In times of peace and tranquility, if the
majority infringes upon basic rights and constitutional values, it would usually be in the
interest of the opposition to object. The minorities within the electorate which the
minority party represents would demand such objection.115 In other words, political
incentives for opposition behavior are strong enough. However, in situations of national
crises, the "minority" at risk of oppression is not necessarily the parliamentary minority
or a distinctive group within the society. More often, those threatened by the erosion of a
constitutional value or infringement of a basic right will not be represented in the
legislature as such. For instance, granting the police additional powers of detention,
search and seizure will not necessarily infringe upon the rights of a distinct, represented
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minority. These extra powers might even refer to people who have no electoral rights,
such as illegal immigrants or POW's. These are the rights of the "others".116
Furthermore, many of the means that are used in times of emergency do not
violate constitutional rights of a certain group in the electorate but rather burden an
abstract, non-particular interest. This category includes cases of excessive delegation of
powers from the legislature to the executive branch or laws that are aimed at bypassing
the judiciary. For instance, the establishment of a separate tribunal system by the
executive, with no congressional authorization, can be seen as violating the
constitution.117 Since there is no distinct constituency group which is directly inflicted by
this kind of violations, the incentive of the opposition to oppose these violations
decreases dramatically.
The conclusion is, therefore, that majority-opposition cooperation is feasible
especially in times of national crises, for a vareity of reasons. The main question is, does
this political reality match the constitutional role of the opposition in a democracy and the
justifications for its existence?

IV. The Constitutional Opposition
Indeed, the political phenomenon of opposition loyalty to the majority raises a
normative-constitutional challenge. Description aside, it is hard to find a normative
justification for this intuitive expectation of cooperation in times of crisis. So long as the
opposition is democratic, so long as it promotes public safety and the existence of the
116
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state, why should it suspend its activities in times of war? If the opposition is acting in a
constructive manner, if it does not merely oppose but also proposes, why should it stop
doing so during an emergency, when providing alternatives is arguably even more
important? Opposition behavior takes on additional meaning in times of national crisis. If
we add to this equation the fear of excessive use of force by majorities in times of
emergency,118 then one might argue that a loyal opposition in times of crises is an
opposition which opposes rather than cooperates. The opposition should be loyal to the
public and to democratic values, not to the existing majority and its policy. National
unity, social consensus and an efficient legislature are important goals, but they can not
replace the most basic role of the opposition and the reasons for its presence. Opposition
loyalty, thus, may exist in certain cases but it must be limited. The opposition can not be
too loyal, too patriotic.
But, when does an opposition become too loyal? What is the border line between
understandable and perhaps desirable cooperation on the one hand, and unacceptable
cooperation which results in opposition muteness, on the other?
My main argument, in reply to this dilemma, would be that the constitutional
theory of opposition needs to take one step further. The opposition has a unique
constitutional role, especially in times of national crises. This role is too important to be
left aside for political considerations. Opposition loyalty might be, thus, understandable
in certain cases politically, but unacceptable theoretically. The main argument is therefore
that the opposition should be regarded not only as a political alternative and a part of the
legislative machinery, but also as a constitutional institution. The opposition should be
thus a constitutional opposition. The role of a constitutional opposition goes beyond
118
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being democratic, constructive, and responsible. A constitutional opposition plays a
further role – namely as a guardian of the constitution and its basic values.119 Thus, in
cases where the majority acts in a potentially unconstitutional manner, infringing upon
basic rights and values of democracy, the opposition should do all it can to obstruct this
action.120 If the majority party promotes a law which is prima facia unconstitutional, the
minority party has not just an option but also a constitutional role of opposing it.
Obviously, the representatives – majority and minority - have the freedom to criticize the
constitution and even to amend it according to the procedures it lists. They cannot,
however, violate the constitution unless this violation is according to the constitution
itself. Therefore, if the majority seeks to violate the constitution, the minority – the
opposition – has a role of opposing this violation and guarding the constitution. Doing so
is an expression of loyalty, not disloyalty. The opposition thus acts not against the
constitution but rather as a guarantor of constitutional compliance. Hence, even if in some
cases we would expect the minority party to facilitate majority action, it should not do so
in cases involving an unconstitutional infringement on human rights and constitutional
values. Political loyalty does not trump constitutional loyalty. Consensus, national unity
and efficient legislatures are important but these can not outweigh basic constitutional
values. Furthermore, the role of the opposition as a constitutional opposition does not
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depend on public support or a representative idea but is based on the functions and
justifications of an opposition in a democracy. Therefore, theoretically, the opposition
should oppose human rights violations or breach of constitutional provisions even if the
public represented by the opposition does not request this objection and even wants the
opposition to cooperate with the government. This role of the opposition as a
constitutional guardian is not limited to times of national crisis but applies even in times
of peace. The role assumes heightened importance, however, in times of national crisis,
where human rights and basic values tend to be set aside for "security reasons".
Especially in these situations, the constitutional opposition should not abandon its role of
ensuring the proper application of basic constitutional norms.
The argument in favor of constitutional opposition raises many problems and
questions that must be confronted. First, what are the theoretical grounds for an
oppositional role of opposing violations of the constitution? Which doctrinal arguments
justify it?
Second, the argument in favor of a constitutional role of the opposition raises
many practical problems. Even if the opposition needs to oppose unconstitutional
violations, how will it recognize these violations, especially when the majority will
almost always deny any unconstitutional behavior? Furthermore, as a practical matter, we
might ask whether there is any need for such a heavy constitutional burden on the
opposition. By definition, the opposition is a minority. What is the point of establishing a
constitutional role on the minority which it cannot carry out? How can the opposition use
its inherently limited power to protect human rights and the constitution?
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Third, even if the role of a constitutional guardian is justified, why is it necessary,
given the existing mechanism for guarding the constitution and preserving human rights,
namely the judiciary? If a law is allegedly unconstitutional, it can be challenged in a court
which practices judicial review. What is the point in adding a further check by an
institution which lacks substantial power to begin with?
Lastly, even if there are good theoretical and practical justifications for the
constitutional role of the opposition, there is still a question regarding the nature of this
role. Should it be characterized as a legal duty? Can it be enforced by the courts? Or
perhaps it should be only a political directive or a concept of virtues opposition?
Indeed, these questions require an answer, which is actually the need for a further
understanding of the constitutional analysis of majority- minority interaction as well as the
nature of the constitutional status of the opposition. We will address these questions in
order.

1. The Theoretical Justification for Constitutional Opposition
We should first ask ourselves, on which grounds can we base the idea that the
opposition has a role of opposing unconstitutional behavior by the majority? A partial
answer lies in the justifications for the existence of an institutional minority party in the
first place. One of the primary justifications for the presence of an opposition was the
need to restrain the power of the government. The assumption is that a pluralism of ideas
will limit the government's power to infringe upon basic rights. Thus, the opposition
should have, in theory, an inherent interest in scrutinizing and criticizing governmental
actions. It should have an interest to do so not only as a matter of protecting the interests
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and rights of its constituency, but also as a part of its ongoing rivalry with the majority.
Also, the competition between the minority party and the majority party forces the
majority itself to consider the rights and interests of the minority, in order to maintain its
electoral success. Thus, an opposition in the legislature functions mainly to control the
use of power by the majority and to protect basic rights and constitutional values.
This argument, regarding the role of the opposition, is mainly an historical and
conceptual one. It explains why oppositions were formed in the first place and what role
was assigned to them. But there is a more profound justification for the role of the
opposition as a constitutional guardian. It can be argued that the constitution itself
imposes upon the opposition even a duty to oppose unconstitutional behavior of the
majority. The same democratic constitution that makes it possible for the opposition to
exist also imposes a duty to oppose unconstitutional violations by the majority.
Two arguments ground this complex yet fundamental idea of constitutional law.
The first is constitutional supremacy. If the constitution is the supreme law of the land,
than the legislature cannot breach the constitution unless it amends it according to the
terms set by the constitution itself. In this context, we usually refer to the legislature as a
whole and speak about its duty to adhere to the constitution. But who is this legislature?
Is it only the majority? Why do we narrow this basic constitutional duty to the amorphous
entity of the legislator, rather than impose it on specific members? More specifically, why
can we not argue that the opposition has a duty to adhere to the constitution?
Furthermore, if all state actors must respect the constitution, should not the opposition
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within the legislature be seen as state actor?121 Hence, the duty of the opposition to
protect the constitution derives from the most basic concept of the rule of law.
The second argument is more axiomatic. It is based on a presumption that a
system does not permit itself to be breached. Thus, if the constitution formed a legislative
branch, it did not grant it the power to breach the constitution. The constitution is the
norm that created the legislative branch and entrenched basic rights. There is no reason
to interpret the constitution in a way that allows one part of it to prevail over another or to
permit the legislature to infringe upon basic rights. One might even argue that basic rights
trump legislative powers. If this is the case, then the opposition – which is the organized
alternative within the legislature and is formed through the constitutional provisions
regarding the legislator – has a duty to be constitutional. It should, therefore, protect the
constitution.
In sum, basic notions of democracy and constitutionalism give a firm base to the
argument that the opposition has a role and function of guarding the constitution.

2. Why Do We Need the Opposition to Oppose Unconstitutional Behavior?
Even if the proposition regarding the constitutional role of the opposition as a
guardian of the constitution is theoretically sound, there are still many important practical
questions which must be addressed. Assuming that the opposition should oppose
unconstitutional violations by the majority, how can the opposition trace these violations?
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It lacks the expertise of constitutional law analysis. Moreover, the majority will usually
not admit that it violates the constitution. On the contrary, it will justify its policy as
being completely constitutional.
It is true, that for reasons of lack of expertiseand the majority's constitutional
rhetoric, the opposition faces a challenge in identifying unconstitutional violations of the
majority. These obstacles, however, can be mostly overcome. The opposition may, for
instance, establish a forum of

experts in constitutional law who will evaluate any

proposed law and opine on its constitutionalism. The opposition may receive assistance
from NGO's and civil liberty associations. Furthermore, in some democracies, the
opposition has a constitutional right of referring a law or even a bill to the constitutional
court for a judicial opinion on its constitutionality.122 Indeed, in most of the cases the
majority will not admit that the proposed law is violating the constitution. Yet in some
cases it might admit that the law is not necessarily constitutional. This might be the cases
in stages of national emergency, when some tend to argue that there is a possibility of
acting outside the ordinary laws and constitution.123 In these cases, the "constitutional
alarm" regarding the possible constitutional violation of the law, might be more apparent,
enabling the opposition to fulfill its role as a guardian of the constitution. Therefore, the
ability of the opposition to precisely decide which law is allegedly violating the
constitution is not perfect. It still exists, however. It is applicable no less than is the
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general imperative of the rule of law. We must all respect the constitution even though
we cannot always be sure when we violate it.
Even if the opposition can identify cases of prima facia constitutional violations,
there is still another potential major problem with its constitutional proposed role.
Arguably, there is no point to minority opposition. Even if there are good theoretical
justifications for the constitutional role of the opposition, there is still a major difficulty
with its effectiveness. Indeed, as a minority, the opposition cannot completely prevent the
majority from violating the constitution. However, there is still a lot it can do. The
opposition can, in certain cases, delay the legislative machinery by filibustering a
proposal. It can make use of its powers within the committees and the standing
committees. It also has the ability to gather important information about the proposed law
and to force the majority to explain the need for the constitutional violation and to expose
its scope. More importantly, the opposition can use the media and other means in order to
alert the public and to create pressure on the majority to redraw its plans. The opposition
might aim these tactics at specific members of the majority, in order to weaken their
support of the unconstitutional proposal. Even if the law does pass, the opposition may
still be able to challenge its constitutionality directly or indirectly in court.124
The opposition can use these oppositional activities to show not only the malus in
the proposed law but also how its goals can be better achieved. Thus, a constructive and
responsible opposition will give the public and the legislature an alternative plan which
would achieve the relevant important national interests without violating the constitution.
By providing an alternative, the opposition remains democratic, even as it opposes the
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law. The opposition should take care not to obstruct the legislative procedure in a way
that hinders the ability of the state to protect itself.
The ability of the opposition to set up an alternative coherent plan is particularly
important in times of national crisis, when there is a demand for harsh legislation in order
to restore security. Indeed, national crises are often characterized by a demand for
sweeping executive powers and weakening controls over the use of those powers.
Sometimes, the government tries to exaggerate the scope of the danger or hide the ways
in which its policy violates the constitution. In these circumstances, the legislator plays an
important role in controlling the executive while representing a broader swath of
interests.125 The opposition within the legislator plays an even more important role. It can
show that there is a way to combat terror, for instance, while using more proportional
means or without infringing upon human rights at all. It can question the factual
assumptions which the government presents and present alternative data and information.
It can also emphasize to the public that there is a long-term price to pay for violating the
constitution and that it is dangerous to make it easy for the executive to infringe upon
basic rights.

3. Why Judicial Review Is Insufficient?
The idea that the opposition has a role of being a constitutional opposition, i.e.,
monitoring and opposing unconstitutional violations of the majority, raises another
difficulty. It can be argued, that the constitutional organ which guaranties compliance
with the court is the judiciary. The concept of judicial supremacy places the burden of
guarding the constitution upon the courts. This is correct - the argument follows- not only
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in terms of constitutional theory but also in terms of qualification, expertise and power.
Courts are experts in constitutional law and have also powers and procedures which give
them better tools in analyzing the constitutionality of a law and in needed cases, to grant
also a proper remedy.
Indeed, we would do well to distinguish between the role of the courts and the
role of the opposition in protecting the constitution, especially in times of national crisis.
Courts are the primary organ that can rule on the constitutionality of a law or an
administrative act and grant an effective remedy in cases of violation. Courts can abolish
a law or void an administrative act. The opposition cannot. Courts are professional,
impartial reviewers and not political opportunists. Courts are a strong, independent,
nonrepresentative, and counter-majoritarian institution. No one argues, therefore, that the
opposition can or should replace courts as the guardians of the constitution.
However, oppositions play an important role independent of the function of the
judiciary. Courts do not have the option of suggesting an alternative agenda or policy.
They review the act but usually cannot suggest replacing it with another plan.126 Though
opposition leaders do not enjoy majority support within society, they do enjoy some
support and legitimacy that courts may lack in certain cases. The opposition is thus a
representative institution. It might have better information about certain issues than the
courts, and it is not bound by institutional restraints. Thus, the opposition can advocate its
opinion through a constant usage of the media. Opposition officials do not have to be
impartial. The opposition is not bound by the "political question" doctrine or problems of
justiciability and standing. Its range of action is not formally defined. These features
assume heightened importance in times of national crisis. During these periods, courts
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sometimes fail to see the whole picture. They face a problem of public confidence and
support.127 Furthermore, constitutional provisions and laws might weaken or disable the
powers of courts during national crises, for instance, by forming alternative courts and
tribunals or by explicitly immunizing certain activities from judicial review. These
restrictions on the judiciary may demonstrate the importance of further checks and
balances like the opposition. Furthermore, opposition leaders and members might have
better knowledge and experience in assessing the needs and preferred policy. The
opposition's activities within the legislature may succeed in blocking some of the
majority’s unconstitutional bills, by eroding the initial support for them. In doing so, the
opposition will reduce the amount of pressure on the courts. In addition, the laws enacted
will likely reach the courts only after a debate in Congress and in public. This debate will
not only highlight the meaning of the law and the alternatives to it, but it will also delay
the passage of the law and its eventual consideration before the court. This last feature –
time – is significant in times of national crisis. The public and the majority tend to react
very strongly in the short term. That period is the most dangerous in terms of
constitutional violations and excessive use of force. Any justified delay in these
circumstances will help the legislator and the courts arrive at a reasonable and balanced
decision, rather than a decision driven by the emotions of the crisis.
The opposition does not provide an alternative mechanism to judicial review by
the courts but rather supplements and facilitates the ability of courts to protect the
constitution in times of national crisis. This role becomes even more meaningful in light
of the argument that courts also tend to become too loyal in times of national crisis and to
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give less protection to civil liberties.128 If this is true, an additional check on the majority
may even be a necessity. The opposition can serve this function in times of national
crisis.

4) Should There Be a Legal Duty to Oppose?
The justification of the constitutional opposition concept, both theoretically and
practically, raises a further question: Is this constitutional role of the opposition a legal
duty or merely an idea of political virtue? Should there be a mechanism that reviews
opposition behavior and enforces its constitutional role or that the political market primarily elections - should be the one which regulates opposition behavior?
Indeed, the idea that there should be a constitutional duty to oppose might be seen
as radical, for two primary reasons: The first one is our basic understanding of
representative government and free mandate. We tend to think of representatives as
special entities. Though they are a part of the state and constitute the legislature, we grant
representatives privileges and immunities aimed at enabling them to engage in free and
independent decision making. This theory is known as the free mandate theory and has
several historical, practical and theoretical justifications.129 One of the clear implications
of this theory is that there are no legal restraints over the individual decision making of a
representative. No court will order a legislative representative to vote this way or
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another.130 No voter will be able to sue a representative for his or her vote. Judicial
review by the courts is exercised based not on the personal votes of the representatives
but rather on their cumulative effect. Courts review legislative outcomes; they do not
psychoanalyze the legislators. Therefore, it is problematic to impose a duty on a
representative to vote in a certain manner, whether it is a duty of the majority party not to
vote for a proposed law or the duty of the minority party to vote against a proposed law,
even when the law is unconstitutional. Free mandate theory implies not only the freedom
to oppose but also the freedom not to oppose.131
A second reason we may be reluctant to impose a positive duty to oppose stems
from theoretical and practical aspects of separation of powers. A theoretical problem is
that judicial review is usually limited to a final act of another branch and not of its
internal management. Thus, courts do not review the voting itself but rather the
anonymous legislative outcome which is the law. If courts were to review the individual
vote, they would be seen as putting themselves in the place of each legislator – a violation
of the separation of powers. There is a difference between instructing someone how to
vote and reviewing the legality of the final decision on its merits. Hence, since a positive
enforceable duty to oppose means that a court could order a representative how to vote, it
is clear why such an order conflicts with the idea of separation of powers. In addition,
there are practical reasons for courts to refrain from intervening in legislation proceedings
that have not yet concluded. Courts review a law only when it is final. Until then, there is
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no reason to review it, because it might change or fail to pass at all. Practically, therefore,
how could a court order the opposition to oppose? An ex-ante order of this kind is
premature, and an ex-post order is irrelevant since the law is final and had the needed
majority anyway.
Beside the theoretical obstacles for the concept of a duty to oppose, one might ask
whether there is a real point in it? Hence, it might be argued that the concept of
constitutional opposition can exist also without any duty attached to it. Therefore, the
opposition should be evaluated politically and by the public on the basis of its actions and
omissions. One might argue that opposing unconstitutional violations and protecting the
constitution is important, but this is only a political option which the opposition may or
may not adapt. The sanction for failing is therefore political and not legal. This argument
against the legalization of opposition behavior might find strong support in the political
analysis of opposition loyalty cases. If the political incentives for opposition-majority
cooperation are so strong, especially in times of crises, then any imposition of a legal
constitutional duty might be totally ineffective and lead to an erosion and dilution of the
constitution itself.
Should the conclusion be that the idea of constitutional opposition ought to be
seen as a political virtue rather than a legal concept? It is true that the argument against
the imposition of a legal duty to oppose unconstitutional violations is a strong one, for its
theoretical and practical reasons. I do think, however, that despite the theoretical and
practical difficulties, there should still be a legal duty upon the opposition to oppose.
However, this duty should be regarded as a non enforceable duty.132 This is a duty that

132

The idea of a non enforceable constitutional duty is might be seen as a conceptual problem especially in
terms of positive law. It can be argued, hence that a duty which is not subject to an enforcement mechanism

54
has a firm legal and constitutional basis, but it is still a duty that courts will not enforce.
Why should the constitutional role of the opposition be characterized, despite all the
difficulties, as a legal duty?
First, in terms of rule of law and constitutional supremacy, it is hard to justify an
exemption of the opposition. Problems of enforceability and the advantages of political
market regulation cannot change the basic notion and understanding of constitutional
supremacy and rule of law. They may explain why this role of the opposition should not
be legally enforced, especially taking into account the pragmatic problems of deciding
when the majority is violating the law and which is the best strategy to oppose it.
However, the fact that courts do not review the votes of each individual representative
does not change the representative's basic constitutional duty to act according to the
constitution. In discussing the legislature as a whole, we say the legislature must abide by
the constitution, but that if it fails to do so, courts will review the law. In the individual
context, however, representatives must act according to the constitution, but there is no
direct remedy for their failure to do so. Representatives have a duty to adhere to
constitutional values in their voting, but they are immune from direct legal remedy for
unconstitutional breach. It is therefore important to distinguish between the duty of a
representative and the remedy for breaching it. Representatives must always adhere to
constitutional values and provisions. This is a direct derivative of the concept of
constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. If they fail to do so, however, there is no
direct legal remedy against them as individuals, because of the concepts of free mandate
seizes to be a legal duty at all. Yet it seems that this pure positivist approach is not always followed, as
there are cases in which a duty still exists despite its lack of enforcement. See for instance Lawrence G.
Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.REV. 1212
(1978). Another example might be the Custom, which is usually seen as a norm despite the fact that it is not
enforced,
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and separation of powers, as well as other practical reasons Therefore, if an
unconstitutional bill is proposed, the opposition has a constitutional duty to oppose it.
There are no direct legal remedies if it fails to do so, but the lack of remedies does not
vitiate the constitutional duty. The same duty applies also to the majority party
representatives. However, in that case, a failure to respect the constitution will result in a
final law subject to judicial review. Hence, on an outcome base level, there is a difference
between the minority opposition's and the majority's duty. But on a theoretical level, both
the majority and the opposition have the same duty – to adhere to constitutional values
and provisions.
A second reason for characterizing the constitutional role of the opposition as a
legal duty and not merely a political option is the important rhetoric value of such a duty.
If opposing unconstitutional violations is mainly a political option, then it becomes also a
part of the political controversy. Violating the constitution might even be seen as a
legitimate option, as well as not opposing such a violation. In my point of view, this is a
problematic outcome. The constitution can obviously be amended, and any debate over
its scope and interpretation is not only possible but also essential in any pluralistic
democracy. But as long as the constitution has not been amended, its violation is
impermissible, politically and legally. The majority and the opposition might still come to
a different conclusion and find sufficient incentives to cooperate while enacting a
unconstitutional law. This fact should not change the nature of the law as unconstitutional
and the activity of each member of the legislature who supported the law – or did not
oppose it – as violating the constitution. Any other rhetoric might undermine the rule of
law and constitutional supremacy. Furthermore, understanding the role of the opposition
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as a legal duty – though unenforceable – might result in a better knowledge of the public
and voters on the precise nature of its representative's activities. Thus, there is a
difference between an opposition that cooperated with the majority out of loyalty to the
national interest, and an opposition which did so while breaching its constitutional duty.
The public might disapprove of unconstitutional behavior and thus create an incentive for
the opposition not to cooperate but to oppose in cases of unconstitutional violations of the
majority. Another plausible result could be that the political parties themselves would
debate the adherence of each of them to the constitutional duty. The outcome of such
debate could be the strengthening of the constitutional values and the political consensus
over the constitutional supremacy.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that the role of the opposition as a constitutional
opposition should be characterized as a constitutional legal duty. This duty is
unenforceable for theoretical and practical reasons. However, it is still a duty that needs
to be articulated and preserved despite the strong political incentives to ignore it,
especially in times of national crises and emergency.

V. Conclusion
The role of the opposition in modern democracies is complex. I have shown that
this notion is not a construct of political science but is one of the pillars of democracy.
The opposition should be analyzed as a distinct institution with specific rights and duties,
including the duty to be democratic, constructive and responsible. The more problematic
notion of opposition is the one of opposition loyalty. Thus, we sometimes expect the
opposition to be loyal to the majority, especially in times of national crisis. However, I

57
have argued that this loyalty must be limited by another role of the opposition – its duty
to behave as a constitutional opposition. Hence, I have argued, sometimes even during
national emergencies, the opposition has a role of opposing the majority. This is the case
when the majority seeks to violate the constitution and infringe upon basic rights of
individuals who may not be represented. A constitutional opposition must be loyal to the
constitution. Particularly in times of national crisis, the existence of the opposition and its
proper functioning are extremely important, since these times are characterized by the
tendency toward excesses of power by the executive and violations of basic rights. The
role of opposing constitutional violations has a firm theoretical and practical basis. It does
not replace judicial review by the courts but is a supplementary device. It should even be
seen as a legal duty, though not an enforceable one.
There is understandable concern over regulating and intervening in actions of
"political" institutions. However, this fear should not lead jurists to ignore the existence
and role of the opposition. So long as there is a majority, there will be a minority. If we
want the majority to work well, we need to ensure that the minority works well, too. A
better understanding of the role of the minority party can have significant implications for
the legal status of the opposition. Acknowledging the importance of a strong and
functional opposition, especially in times of national crisis, can result in reforms that
strengthen the minority party within the legislature. Since the duty to oppose is not an
enforceable duty, constitutional law should focus on creating the proper institutional
incentives for oppositional behavior. Such institutional incentives might grant the
opposition better tools to challenge the minority and narrow the situation of opposition
loyalty to the majority. Thus, one might reconsider internal congressional rules, for
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instance, to check whether they give the minority party a fair opportunity to oppose.133
We might ask whether the current constitutional theory and court's rulings regarding
primaries laws and party autonomy fit the desired role of the minority party; whether they
encourage strong and distinctive responsible parties or rather promote individual nonpartisan politics. We might question, for example, whether the opposition has sufficient
time to debate the issues and even use filibustering;134 if it has enough resources to cope
with the majority and the its control of government bureaucracy;135 and if the powers of
the House or Senate chairperson or speaker are overly partisan.136 Further questions that
might be asked are whether the opposition party has a fair chance to access the media and
express its view; whether it has sufficient information and tools to check and balance the
majority power;137 whether it can seek redress in court if the majority denies its rights or
uses oppressive tactics.138 Furthermore, it can be argued that there should be special
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mechanisms to amplify the power of the opposition party, especially in times of national
crisis. For instance, we might advocate for a constitutional reform requiring a
supermajority to declare a national emergency,139 thus granting the opposition party a
veto power in some cases. All these means – and others – should be considered in each
democracy, according to its specific features and constitutional traditions. Together, they
can form a "code" of rights and duties of the opposition.140 The underlying principle
behind all of them is that the opposition minority party has an important role in a
democracy, especially in times of crises and that the legal community cannot – and
should not – ignore this role.
True, there has been a decline in the role of parliaments in general and
oppositions in particular. Direct democracy – initiatives, recall and referendum have
helped weaken the parliaments and parties. The constant pursuit of consensus has
undermined the legitimacy and role of the opposition.141 The increasing power of interest
groups, the media and government bureaucracy have weakened both political parties and
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oppositions.142 Globalization also plays a role in weakening national parliaments and
oppositions while subjecting the ability of a party to implement its ideology to regional
and global constraints.143 However, there is still a need for a pluralism of ideas within the
legislature; there is still a need for a group within the parliament that constitutes a
legitimized alternative,144 a group which channels public opinion to the legislature and
the executive in an open and transparent manner.145 Strengthening the status of the
opposition should be seen therefore as an important element in preserving
parliamentarianism and democracy.146 This is especially true in the era of terrorism, when
it is particularly important to make sure that responses are rational and take long-term
considerations into account. The heaviest burden is on the majority and the government
which are accountable. But democracy is not only about the best use of power but also
about the safeguards and limits on this power – even in times of national crisis.
Constitutional opposition should be regarded therefore not as a numerical fact but rather
as one of the checks and balances in a modern democracy.
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